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THE CASE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION
IN NORTH DAKOTA
LLOYD B. OMDAHL*
As the urbanization and industrialization of society has escalat-
ed interdependence in the American society, great concern has
been expressed over the ability of the states to respond vigorously
and effectively to the challenges consequential to strong national-
izing currents, given constitutions designed for an agrarian nine-
teenth century. Problems completely unforseen by pioneer consti-
tution writers have loomed on the twentieth century horizon which,
if unresolved, will result in new allocations of power between the
state and national levels of the federal republic. To the chagrin
of numerous champions of a state-centered federalism, many state
responsibilities have already moved to the national sector. Inflexible
state constitutions, unresponding in an environment alien to their
power concepts, have contributed to this flow upward.
Because a vigorous society is not static, the future promises
to be as challenging to the states as the past. Writing in The Nation,
Harold Norris suggests that state government will continue to be
on trial in the decades ahead:
Technological, population, financial, human relations and
other problems abound. In the next ten years, New York,
Michigan and the nation will change more than they did in
the last fifty. Government must be able to respond sensitively
and precisely. Genuine representation, and the clear-cut ac-
countability of those with power, will help bring about the
prompt and peaceful change necessary to democratic growth
and survival.1
In response to mounting pressures of the modern era, efforts
to rewrite state constitutions have become greatly accelerated in
recent years. Professor Albert Sturm, America's chief chronicler
* Ass't Professor of Political Science, University of North Dakota. Director, Bureau
of Governmental Affairs, Grand Forks, N.D. A.B., 1953; M.A., 1962; University of North
Dakota.
1. Norris, Constitutions: The Poltios of Power, 280 Tr E NATION 478-474 (Nov. 7,
1956).
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of state constitutional revision, reported on this new drive for con-
stitutional relevance:
It is especially noteworthy that the last 20 years have
witnessed far more relative change in the states' organic
laws than the average for their entire operative life. At the
end of 1969, the average age of all state constitutions was
approximately 85 years. Total average number of amend-
ments ratified in the fifty states was 98.6; of these, 50.9, or
more than half, were added during the last 20 years. These
figures reflect both the growing inadequacy of state consti-
tutions to fulfill modem needs and an accelerating effort
to modernize these documents by the piecemeal amend-
ment method.2
As Sturm indicates, alarm over the need for modernizing state
constitutions is spreading. When the North Dakota Legislature re-
alized that piecemeal amendment had failed to keep pace with
the changing demands on government, it authorized a constitutional
study commission in 1963 to begin an article-by-article revision.
Unfortunately, the proposals of the commission were defeated in
the legislature before submission or killed at the polls. Knowing
that the need for revision continued unmitigated, previous decisions
of the legislature and the electorate notwithstanding, the legislature
submitted a proposal for a constitutional convention which was
approved by the electorate in 1970. This same concern over archaic
constitutional provisions is being demonstrated by new activity in
most of the states of the Union. A majority of states have had
revision commissions functioning during the past decade. Conven-
tions, once oddities, are now becoming commonplace.
But merely acknowledging that state constitutions need revi-
sion hardly pinpoints the specific inadequacies of the North Dakota
document. Weaknesses of state constitutions have become subjects
of exhaustive research by political scientists, good government or-
ganizations, and constitutional study commissions. A survey of the
published research indicates that there is consensus among schol-
ars on the inadequacies of state constitutions. At the same time,
there is also an admission that labeling those inadequacies can be
highly subjective. After all, constitutions do reflect the aspirations
of competing groups and philosophies. What may appear to be
an inadequacy to one will be construed to be a strength by another.
With the subjectivity of the undertaking recognized at the outset,
this article will attempt to describe the most salient weaknesses
2. Address by Albert Sturm, National Conference on Government, Portland, Oregon,
August 25, 1970.
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of the North Dakota Constitution to which substantial consensus
could probably be claimed.
1. Document of Distrust
Most critics of state constitutions seem to suffer from an ir-
resistable compulsion to begin immediately with the classification
of trees before considering the general composition of the forest.
"Detail," they diagnose in unison, is the major evil of state con-
stitutions and they almost always initiate all discussion from that
one point. But detail in state constitutions is merely a symptom
of a more serious malady that saps the vigor of state governments.
Detail is a symptom of an inadequate philosophy of government.
The philosophy that undergirds state constitutions exudes with
pervading distrust of man as a rational, honorable being. Penned
with an abiding suspicion of man's inherent wickedness, state con-
stitutions have been passed down as sad commentaries on human
nature and monuments to the awesome memories of King George III.
To keep oppressive officials from subverting public power for their
own greedy purposes, state constitutions have been designed to
imprison and manacle every officeholder, assumed to be nothing
more than a potential tyrant.
In the National Civic Review, James Miller observed:
The basic fact to appreciate about state constitutions is
that they are designed not to help government officials gov-
ern but to prevent them from picking the taxpayer's pockets.
The reason? Many of today's constitutions were drafted in
the era between the Civil War and the turn of the century-
the period of the Robber Barons, The Boss Tweeds, "the
shame of our cities." During these years, more than half
of the states wrote their present constitutions, designed spe-
cifically to force honesty in government.
Emanating from this inherent distrust of all government gen-
erally and state government specifically are a series of provisions
that impair responsiveness in state governments. North Dakota
founders shared this distrust as they drafted the state's basic docu-
ment; it is replete with evidence.
Section 25 provides for the initiative and referendum on the
basic assumption that the legislators elected to determine public
policy either would not pass the good laws demanded by the citizenry
or they would pass bad ones from which citizens must protect
8. Miller, Dead Hand of the Paat, 57 NAT'L. Cmwe REv. 183 (April, 1968).
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themselves. Further, for fear that a legislative majority would
circumscribe the power of the initiative and referendum, the section
is made self-executing with the proviso that "laws may be enacted
to facilitate its operation, but no laws shall be enacted to hamper,
restrict or impair the exercise of the rights herein reserved to
the people. ' 4
Section 39 provides that no legislator may hold an office, the
emoluments of which had been increased by the legislature, on the
presumption that corrupt legislators would flock en masse to reap
the profits of their own actions.
Section 45 sets legislative salaries at five dollars per day-on
the assumption that, if left to the legislature, it would abscond
with the public treasury. It also provides that they be paid 10 cents
per mile of necessary travel "on the most usual route" to the state
capitol. The insertion of the phrase "on the most usual route"
strongly suggests that legislators would travel by very circuitous
routes merely to increase their travel allowances.
Section 56 provides that "no regular sessions of the legislative
assembly shall exceed 60 days" 5-on the theory that legislators
would probably loiter in Bismarck in order to receive their exces-
sive emoluments of five dollars per day for service.
Section 71 vests the "executive power" in the governor but
proceeds to fragmentize this power in sections 72 and 82 with
numerous independent officials-all elected-since no one person
could be trusted with power on the state level.
Section 90 provides for the election of judges--on the premise
that the power of appointment by the executive and or legislature
would lead to a corrupt judiciary.
Article 33 provides for opportunities to recall public officials
before their terms expire-since many of them could not be trusted
to act responsibly even until the next election occurred.
Even the electorate is not beyond suspicion. To prevent the
injudicious use of his vote, the citizen must be protected from
his ignorance with the incorporation of minimum residence and
age qualifications for public offices lest voters be led astray by
the compelling flute of some recent immigrant or the hypnotic ap-
peal of a youthful firebrand. In some states, constitutions even limit
the number of terms officials may serve since the electorate is too
incompetent to know when it has had enough.
4. N.D. CONST. art. II, § 25.
5. N.D. CONST. art. II, § 56.
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Since much of the impetus for state constitution reform emanates
from the shift of power to the national government, it is appropriate
at this juncture to contrast the philosophy reflected in the Federal
Constitution with that found in the states. Without question, the
miracle of this millenium was the constitutional convention that
sweltered out the summer of 1787 in Philadelphia. Even though
the members had personally experienced the ravages of tyrannical
monarchy, the framers of the United States Constitution were able
to reason out a philosophy of man and frame a government that
would be functional for over 180 years.
In a spirited defense of the new constitution which vested con-
siderable power in national officials, James Madison used Federalist
No. 10 to spell out the philosophy that justified the new constitution.
He said that citizens should not be unduly alarmed with the broad
delegation of power to the new government because the effect
of this representative government was to "refine and enlarge the
public views by passing them through a medium of a chosen body
of citizens, whose wisdom may discern the true interest of their
country and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least
likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations.'"
No such trust is found in state constitutions. "Wisdom to discern
. . .patriotism . . . love of justice . . ." none of these abstract, il-
lusive generalities were given a shred of validity in state documents.
It is true that there was no unanimity in the land in 1787
for placing this much trust in public officials. To this attack on
the Constitution, James Madison responded in Federalist No. 55:
Were the pictures which have been drawn by the political
jealousy of some among us faithful likenesses of the human
character, the inference would be, that there is not sufficient
virtue among men for self-government; and that nothing less
than the chains of despotism can restrain them from destroy-
ing and devouring one another.7
Fortunately, the arguments of Madison prevailed the Consti-
ution was ratified. The states and the national government went
their separate ways, charting their courses on their particular as-
sessments of whether or not man could be trusted with power
sufficient to govern. While the leaderless states, with public officials
cautiously hobbled, have drifted ineffectively, history has exoner-
ated Madison's confidence in man. Only on rare occasions have
national officeholders subverted the national good for selfish pur-
6. THu FEDERALIST No. 10, at 77 (New American Library ed. 1961) (Madison).
7. THE FuDERALIST No. 55, at 364 (Mod. Library ed.) (Madison).
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poses. Less than 15 impeachments-most of them minor judicial
officials-have been initiated by Congress against the whole federal
establishment in 180 years. And the only one launched against
a President was the result of malicious trickery. In exchange for
these rare blemishes, the discretion accorded national officials has
enabled the national government to rise time and again to cope
with scores of foreign and domestic crises.
On the other hand, states have been well rewarded for their
suspicions. Constitutional prohibitions notwithstanding, they have suf-
fered from blatant graft and corruption. By distributing power
to numerous officials, they have blurred accountability and nur-
tured a breeding ground for malfeasance in office. While the in-
numerable good public servants have bowed respectfully to the
constitutional limitations and declined from doing the good that
demanded doing, the unscrupulous have paid little regard to con-
stitutions as they rode roughshod over responsible government.
There is no escaping the logical sequence that evolves from
the theory that most officeholders will be corrupt. Distrust breeds
restriction; restriction impairs action. If the 1971-72 North Dakota
Constitutional Convention adheres to the same philosophy of public
officials that prevailed in the 1889 assembly, then a similar number
of restrictions will reappear in the new draft to be submitted
to the citizenry in 1972. In the final analysis, the responsiveness
of the proposed state government will be contingent primarily on
how the delegates perceive the nature of man.
2. Fundamentals Lost
The second major criticism of state constitutions is that while
they should confine themselves to the fundamental principles of
government, they are infested with countless decisions that are
legislative in nature. A good portion of the legislative matter found
in constitutions can be traced back to the lack of confidence con-
stitution writers demonstrated in legislative assemblies. Rather than
trust some new gathering to make decisions that appeared rational
to them, they proceeded to fill the constitutions with legislative
decisions.
As a member of the 1870 Illinois Constitutional Convention is
alleged to have said to his colleagues: "It is assumed that when
we depart from this hall all the virtue and all the wisdom of
the state will have departed with us.""
In addition to an abiding distrust of the competence of succeed-
8. Quoted by W. DODD, STArR GOVERNMENT 96 (1928).
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ing legislatures, this mania for legislating in constitutions is fed
by an ignorance of the functions of a constitution. Distinguishing
the "fundamental" from the "legislative" is difficult for constitu-
tional scholars, let alone forcing the duty of defining them upon
a lay convention called upon to piece together basic documents
with only a few short months of study.
Scholars have sought to clarify the distinction in this fashion:
"A constitution is analogous to a topographical map: it charts
the political terrain on which the battles of policy are fought." 9
Robert Dishman, writing in the National Municipal League series
on state constitutions, suggested that "in the broadest sense, a
subject may be regarded as fundamental if it reflects the more
or less fixed convictions of the vast majority of a state's citizens
as to what kind of society it wants."'10
Dishman also quotes Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo as writing
that "a [good] constitution states or ought to state not rules for
the passing hour but principles for an expanding future. '"'
In The Drafting of State Constitutions, Frank P. Grad warns
of the consequences of inserting temporary matters into constitu-
tions:
The enduring qualities of a provision of the state con-
stitution may protect a desirable policy from frivolous
changes by the legislature, or it may delay or prevent the
change to a new and better policy from one embedded in
the constitution which is no longer responsive to current
needs.1 2
In spite of these repetitious exhortations to the contrary, even
the newer state constitutions fail to acknowledge the distinction
between legislative and fundamental. "The truth is that constitu-
tions," one writer commented, "particularly those of the states,
contain many provisions which fall far short of being fundamental
in character."'
State constitutions are filled with examples. The constitutions
of Illinois, Florida, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Tennessee and Wash-
ington flatly prohibit lawmakers from adopting a graduated income
tax; in Alabama, 87 per cent of all state revenue is constitutionally
9. W. CRANE & M. WALTS, STATE LEGISLATIVE SYSTEMS 109 (1968).
10. R. DISHMAN, STATE OoNSTITUTIONS: THE SHAPE OF THE DOCUMENT 26 (1968).
11. B. CAIRozO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 24 (1921), quoted in DISHMAN,
supra note 10, at 28, 29.
12. F. GaAD, THE DRAFTINO OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 6 (1967).
13. Walker, Myth and Reality in State Constitution Development, in STATE CONSTITU-
TIONAL REVISION 13 (W. Graves ed. 1960).
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earmarked for specific purposes; 14 the Louisiana Constitution names
two bridges spanning the Mississippi after Huey Long and declares
his birthday to be forever a holiday; no unmarried woman under 14
may constitutionally engage in sexual intercourse in South Carolina;
public schools are required to teach "elements of agriculture, hor-
ticulture, stockfeedings, and domestic science" in Oklahoma; the
Texas legislature is authorized to define and punish "barratry"; and
the California Constitution permits the legislature to define and pun-
ish "bucketing."' 15
The North Dakota Constitution bears the imprint of legislative
policy-making. Section 26 fixes the exact size of the senate at 49
members, making reapportionment most difficult for succeeding
legislative assemblies. Section 66 requires the presiding officer to
sign bills in the presence of the house. Some legislators would
contend that a good deal of the present legislative article, prescrib-
ing procedures, constitutes legislation better left to the assembly
itself.
Article VII, encompassing sections 131-146, delves into the regu-
lation of private corporations while article IX details the adminis-
tration of the public school lands with over 2,250 words. The detail
in article IX has forced six different amendments through the
years.
Constitutional regulation of the debt limits of political subdiv-
isions (section 183) has caused difficulty for scores of local govern-
ments with the repeal of the personal property taxes.
Section 186 details the handling of public funds, excepts oper-
ating funds for certain proprietary-type functions, and then proceeds
to exempt a score of special occupational licensing bodies from
financial control.
Sections 215 and 216 name and locate the institutions of the
state. Amendments have been necessary on several occasions in
history to make changes dictated by the times.
These are but a few examples of those sections that could be
construed as the most undebatable usurpation of legislative decisions
by constitutional provisions. Depending on an individual's interpre-
tation of fundamental and legislative, another 20 or 30 provisions
could be added to this abbreviated listing.
"The consequences of inflexibility and the resulting loss of adapt-
14. Armbister, The Octopus in the State House, THn SATURDAY EVENING PosT, Feb. 12,
1966, at 71.
15. DISHMAN, supra note 10, at 31.
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ability to change is obsolescence," Frank P. Grad advises. "In
turn, the inflexibility and obsolescence of constitutional provisions
will diminish the power and the freedom of the government to deal
with new situations, and will, by the same token, decrease its
responsibility for consequences it has no power to control." 1 6
3. The Structural Derangement of Government
Two of the functions of a state constitution are to (1) provide
the framework of government and (2) allocate the powers necessary
to enable the mechanism to function in harmony. The wisdom
with which state constitutions perform these two functions has come
under widespread criticism because most state constitutions provide
for what Walter Lippmann has called the "derangement" of power.
In his book, The Public Philosophy, Lippmann contends that
"the executive is the active power in the state, the asking and
the proposing power. The representative assembly is the consenting
power, the petitioning, the approving and the criticizing, the accept-
ing and the refusing power. '"17
"The two powers," he continues, "are necessary if there is to
be order and freedom. But each must be true to its own nature,
each limiting and complementing the other. The government must
be able to govern and the citizens must be represented in order
that they shall not be oppressed. The health of the system depends
upon the relationship of the two powers. If either absorbs or de-
stroys the functions of the other power, the constitution is de-
ranged."18
It is generally agreed that state constitutions are deranged in
that the state executive is not given the constitutional authority
to govern. Structurally, state constitutions tend to provide for a
number of executives and independent administrative units.
The Kestnbaum Commission of the 1950's observed in its report
to President Eisenhower that "the American System of separation
of powers works best when all branches of government are strong,
energetic and responsible. 1 9
"Today," the report continued, "few states have an adequate
executive branch headed by a governor who can be held generally
accountable for executing and administering the laws of the state.
16. GRAD, sUpra note 12, at 21.
17. W. LIPPMAN, Tun PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 30 (1955).
18. Id.
19. COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
TRANSMITTAL TO THE CONGRESS 42 (1955).
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State constitutions provide in principle for three equal branches of
government, but most of these constitutions and numerous laws
based on them include provisions that tend to undermine this prin-
ciple."2 0
Only four states have one elected official-Maine, New Jersey,
New Hampshire, and Tennessee. But Maine elects a 7-member
executive council to share the governor's appointing powers and
New Hampshire has five councilors elected by counties to share
in the governor's appointing powers. Hawaii and Alaska each have
two executive officials elected on a joint ballot.2 1 From this point,
states skew out in all directions, electing any variety of public of-
ficials and members of constitutional boards and commissions.
In response to this fragmentation of the state executive, Dawn
Metsch, writing for the Illinois Constitutional Convention, observed
that "the overwhelming weight of scholarly opinion supports the
thesis that effective American state government requires a single,
strong, popularly elected executive with adequate powers to serve as
the principal spokesman for and leader of the broadest possible public
interest.
22
The National Municipal League proposes that the executive
power be vested in the governor with the argument that "[a]ll
authorities on executive organization agree with the position em-
braced by the Model State Constitution for more than 40 years
that administrative power and responsibility should be concentrated
in a single popularly elected chief executive.
' 23
Even Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist No. 70 subscribed to
this good government principle in his defense of a single national
executive.
"A feeble executive implies a feeble execution of the govern-
ment," he argued. "A feeble execution is but another phrase for
bad execution; and a government ill executed, whatever it may
be in theory, must be, in practice, a bad government. ' 24
Some 180 years later, a body of the nation's most outstanding
businessmen organized as the Committee for Economic Develop-
ment, proposed: "Governors should become chief executives in fact
as well as name. ' 25
20. Id.
21. Netsch, The Executive, in CONSTITUTIONAL RESEARCH GROUP, CoN-CoN: ISSUES FOR
THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 157 (1970).
22. Id. at 148.
23. NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION 65 (1968).
24. THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 423 (New American Library ed. 1961) (Hamilton).
25. COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, MODERNIZING STATE GOVERNMENT 20 (1967).
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"Except for a jointly elected lieutenant-governor," they recom-
mended, "the governor should be the state's only elective executive
official. He should have a four-year term, and freedom to seek
re-election without restriction as to the number of terms." 26
The proposal to convert elective officials to appointive adminis-
trators has been successfully thwarted in most states in which
it has been proposed. Not only do the elected office-holders rigor-
ously defend their independent status but many citizens have become
so imbued with the fear of stronger executives that they choose
not to support the election of modern "dictators."
To analyze the effect of such proposed changes on the legis-
lative-executive interrelationship, Deil S. Wright conducted an ex-
tensive study of 933 department and agency heads in the 50 states.
In reporting his findings, Wright discounted the validity of the
cry "dictatorship" to proposals to strengthen the governor in the
administration:
We may conclude that the net effect of structural reform
and reorganization at the state level has not been to elevate
the governor as the master of administrative management.
Rather, the effects of strengthening the governor, based on
the data from states where governors are stronger, has been
to give him about an even chance in competing with the
legislature for influence over the courses of action taken by
state administrations .27
"Our findings show that even in states where governors are
the strongest," he continued, "they are far from having dictatorial,
monoply, or predominant control in the eyes of the top state ad-
ministrators."28
While North Dakota has managed to confine the number of
constitutional agencies to the board of higher education, the board
of university and school lands, the pardon board, and the board
of equalization (fewer such creations than many state constitutions)
the state ranks in the "top ten" when it comes to elected adminis-
trators. In addition to the governor, in whom is theoretically vested
by section 71 the "executive power," the constitution provides for
the separate election of the lieutenant governor (section 74). By
providing for a separate lieutenant governor, the structural division
is often- compounded by partisan division in that a lieutenant gover-
nor of the opposite party may well be holding the office.
26. Id. at 20, 21.
27. Wright, Executive Leadership in State Administrations, 11 MDWEST J. POL. SCI.
13 (Feb., 1967).
28. Id.
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Section 82 provides for further fragmentation of the executive
by calling for the election of "a secretary of state, auditor, treasur-
er, superintendent of public instruction, commissioner of insurance,
three public service commissioners, an attorney general, a commis-
sioner of agriculture and labor, and a tax commissioner . . .
The section also permits the legislature to divide the office of
commissioner of agriculture and labor, which was done with the
labor commissioner also elective.
Writing in The Nation, Harold Norris argues that "the over-
riding problem in state constitution making is that of creating
a mechanism of government that is responsive and responsible to
the people's sovereign power. Responsiveness and responsibility can
be attained only when power is both perceptible and accountable."8S
The dispersal of responsibility in North Dakota is hardly perceptible
or accountable. The executive function is rendered structurally in-
effective and state government is deranged as a consequence.
4. Need for Constant Amendment
While the North Dakota Constitution does not even approach
the massive volume of Louisiana's 240,000 words or Alabama's
80,000 words, it still consists of over 25,000 words-some five times
longer than the U. S. Constitution. The more detail in which a
constitution is written, the more it tends to attach itself to a
specific point in time. Then as time changes, the provisions become
obsolete.
Wordiness not only leads to lengthy, avoidable litigation but
it requires a constant effort to amend the document to keep it rele-
vant. David Fellman, author and constitutional scholar, observed:
It is the fate of a long constitution that in the very nature
of things it must grow longer, for there is simply more to
amend. A wordy constitution must be changed frequently,
which makes it wordier still. s l
Professor Albert Sturm has documented the extensive revision
efforts that have been made through the years. In 49 statesS2 a
total of at least 7,965 amendments were proposed before January
1, 1971, or an average of over 162 per constitution. In the 50
states, 4,974 were adopted for an average of 99.5 per constitution.
29. N.D. CONST. art. III, § 82.
30. Norris, eupra note 1, at 475.
31. Fellman, What Is A Good State Constitution?, In CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES To
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION 6-7 (A. Clem ed. 1970).
32. Delaware was not included because the Delaware state legislature has the power
to amend the state constitution without pnmission of the changes to the electorate.
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In the two decades covered between 1950-1970, 3,836 were proposed
(average 78.3 per document); 2,670 were adopted (average 53.4
per document). At the end of 1970, the average age of state con-
stitutions was 85.4 years.38
With an 82-year-old constitution, North Dakota is neither better
off or worse off than other states-with 90 amendments adopted
out of 156 submitted since approval of the original document.
5. Unrealistic Demands on Citizens
While a state constitution must formulate the basic framework
of government and provide basic ground rules for the conduct of
elections to assure a democratic system, the design should ideally be
such that the citizenry can maintain effective control over the gov-
ernment. To effect control, citizens must be able to identify those in
the system who exercise power and to make the decisions that are
critically related to the policy output and performance of the govern-
ment. To scholars and good government advocates, this suggests the
short ballot-the concept that the democratic processes are most ef-
fective when confined to a small number of critical recurring deci-
sions on the part of the electorate.
The election of large numbers of officials and direct decision-
making on numerous policy matters via the initiative and referen-
dum impose a staggering responsibility on citizens who cannot and
do not devote long hours to studying the implications of their elec-
toral decisions. V. 0. Key, Jr., one of the nation's most outstand-
ing scholars on electoral problems, properly dubbed it the "lottery
of the long ballot.""
In making his selections from long lists of candidates for ad-
ministrative offices of all types, the voter has few criteria to guide
him. As a consequence, he votes blindly more often than he would
care to admit. If he feels any pangs of partisanship, he will vote
for his 10 or 12 state party nominees in a straight party vote. For
offices not on the party ballot, he must resort to nationality or
familiarity of names or, just as legitimately, the position of the name
on the ballot. Random voting, conducted with the same abandon of
a gambler selecting choices on a punchboard, is substituted for
thoughtful decision-making.
When the voter comes to an initiated or referred measure, un-
less the measure deals with a single salient issue that has been
33. Sturm, Effective State Governmenta Need Modern Constitutione, 60 NATL. Civic
REV. 66-67 (Feb., 1971).
34. V. KEY, AmERICAN STATE POLITICS 198 (1965).
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widely debated, the voter is compelled to make his decision at the
polls where he is confronted with the issue for the first time. If the
first few phrases strike his fancy, he will vote for it; if he had burnt
toast for breakfast, he will vote against it.
Because studies indicate widespread random (irrational) voting
and voter fatigue (they simply quit voting after the first few names),
the campaign for a short ballot has been pressed forward but with
little success.
In Key's words, "the anachronistic multiple executive remains
and becomes at times a block to effective administration; at others,
a haven for incompetence; and, on occasion, a means of obstruct-
ing the evident majority will." 35
By dispersing governmental authority to a large number of
elected officials and making policy decisions on the ballot, account-
ability is greatly skewed. As a consequence, it is impossible for cit-
izens to hold their government responsible for undesirable or inade-
quate performance. Thus, while the election of large numbers of of-
ficials ostensibly is supposed to result in the most ideal democracy,
in reality it defies democracy because the citizens lose control of
their government when they are unable to pinpoint blame. To con-
trol a government requiring such a large number of decisions to
maintain, the citizen must become a professional political observer.
The decisions imposed on citizens by the North Dakota Consti-
tution are formidable. Because the document reflects a basic dis-
trust of officeholders, it was written in considerable detail and has
required frequent amendment-more frequent than the citizenry has
been able to master. Because the articles submitted to the people
in the 1960's were largely misunderstood, they were defeated and a
constitutional convention became imperative to bring the document
up to date.
Section 25 provides for the processes of the initiative and the ref-
erendum, both forcing citizens to make sophisticated policy decisions.
In many cases, the implications of these issues are not readily dis-
cernable, making manipulation by private interest groups a constant
threat to the integrity of the direct legislation process.
Section 74, providing for the separate election of the governor
and lieutenant governor, requires citizens to understand the im-
plications of a split leadership at the top of the ticket while section
82, providing for the election of the long list of state administrators,
requires that the citizen understands (1) the duties of each office;
(2) the qualifications needed to fill the office; (3) the names and
35. Id,
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qualifications of all competitors for the office; and (4) the ones most
deserving of his vote.
Sections 90 and 104 calling for the election of supreme and dis-
trict court judges require that the electorate assess the professional
qualifications of the attorneys who are candidates for those positions
and decide who are most qualified for the positions, all without the
aid of party designation.
In addition, section 173 calls for the election of a county reg-
ister of deeds, county auditor, treasurer, sheriff, states attorney,
county judge and clerk of the district court, with some modifications
for the smaller counties of the state. Here again, in order for the
voter to control his officeholders and select the best candidates, he
must be intimately acquainted with the offices and the candidates.
The selection of large number of officeholders with a nonpar-
tisan ballot creates a serious problem for an electorate whose pri-
mary electoral orientation is partisan. It is a documented fact that
"partisanship is the most important single influence on political
opinions and voting behavior."36 Without the reference of party to
assist voters in overcoming their lack of information about offices,
random voting is rampant in the nonpartisan contests. The benefit of
nonpartisanship is thus traded for the evil of blind voting in which
nationality and name familiarity become paramount to qualifications.
In summary, the North Dakota Constitution imposes an unbear-
able burden on the citizen. As a consequence, he has lost control
of much of his government and its policies.
6. Perpetuating Archaic Government
Not willing to rely on the wisdom of succeeding legislative as-
semblies, the original constitutional conventions have overdone their
task of framing the government by providing for numerous levels
and units by constitutional fiat. As a consequence, the passing of
time has made some of these structures anachronistic and even hos-
tile to responsive decision-making.
While some state constitutions prescribe in great detail such
constitutional bodies as game and fish commissions, highway boards,
and numerous other such state units, the North Dakota Constitution
has avoided this particular pitfall. It provides for the university and
school lands board (section 156); a pardon board (section 76) which
could be considered somewhat legitimate because it deals with the
sharing of judicial power by the executive branch of government; a
constitutionally independent board of higher education (article 54);
36. W. FLANAGAN, POLITICAL BEHAVIOR OF THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE 35 (1968).
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a designation and location of the institutions of higher learning,
which has probably impaired integration of the state's education
system (section 215); and the designation and location of the charit-
able and penal institutions (section 216).
In addition, it provides for "a clerk and also a reporter of the
supreme court ' 3 7 (section 93) and carves the state into six judicial
districts which cannot be changed without a two-thirds vote of the
legislative assembly. Sections 110-113, providing for county courts,
justices of the peace and police magistrates, limit the flexibility of
the legislature in providing for a more orderly judicial system.
Some scholars would argue that provision for the election of a
large number of state and county administrators also constitutes the
perpetuation of archaic government in that such provisions prevent
the legislature from consolidating offices as workloads change. Sec-
tion 170 permits the legislature to provide for alternate forms of
government under which such offices may be consolidated, thus
leaving consolidation a matter of local option with each county. How-
ever, section 170 requires an unusual majority of 55 per cent in order
for a county to adopt a new form of government. The same major-
ity is required in section 167 for the consolidation of counties, mak-
ing such an effort futile.
The definition of archaic in relation to some of the state and
local units discussed is highly subjective and may well constitute a
very debatable point of view. At issue here, however, is not the ex-
istence of such units so much as the provision of them in a con-
stitution beyond the reach of legislative alteration. If they continue
to serve useful functions, it is highly unlikely that a legislature
would arbitrarily abolish them.
7. Violating the United States Constitution
The United States Constitution establishes the supreme law of
the land as "this constitution, and the laws of the United States
which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the authority of the United States...
any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary
notwithstanding." 8
Technically, it is not possible for state constitutions to harbor
provisions effectively contrary to the supreme law of the land but,
from a very practical standpoint, state constitutions violate the fed-
eral document until the unconstitutional provisions are struck down
through litigation in the courts. Until such litigation is forthcoming,
37. N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 93.
38. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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the provisions, though contrary to the supreme law of the land, pre-
vail.
Scores of provisions in state constitutions fell with the historic
one man-one vote decisions of the United States Supreme Court in
the 1960s. Sections in the North Dakota Constitution, such as section
29 fixing senatorial districts permanently as of 1960 and section 35
requiring that each county have at least one representative, were de-
clared contrary to the supreme law of the land.
Other unconstitutional provisions in the North Dakota document
likely will not be enforced but still do not conform to changes at the
federal level. Section 121 specifies the age of electors to be 21 years
of age while the new 26th amendment to the United States Consti-
tution now specifies 18; the residence requirement of one year for
state elections has been successfully challenged in a federal court
in Minnesota and may well be set aside as a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the 14th amendment unless a compelling state
purpose can be demonstrated. Section 127 authorizes an educational
test for voting, yet a 1970 federal elections law set aside literacy
tests in all states. 89
Section 128 permits women to vote in school elections and would
be unconstitutional if used to prevent women from voting in other
elections as provided by the 19th amendment to the Federal Con-
stitution. Article 33 authorizes the use of the recall against incum-
bent congressmen and would be declared unconstitutional if ever
used because the Federal Constitution provides that "each house
shall be the judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its
own members." 40 Consequently, the seating of congressmen is be-
yond the jurisdiction of a state.
Sections of article VII regulating railroad companies would
probably be ruled an unconstitutional interference in interstate com-
merce.
8. Protecting Interest Groups
The institutionalization of concessions and benefits for special
interest groups is common in many state institutions. Some state
constitutions provide tax privileges to organizations and corporations
that were influential in the drafting of the new document; others
seek to regulate private and corporate conduct in such a fashion so
as to benefit one interest over another.
By and large, North Dakota has avoided the more blatant forms
39. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973 (Supp. 1971).
40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
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of special interest protection. Of such provisions now in the North
Dakota Constitution, impressive arguments could be rallied for either
inclusion or exclusion. Their listings here should not be construed,
therefore, as a prima facie presumption of guilt.
Hidden in the subtleties of section 23 is a restriction on the rights
of unions to bargain for union or closed shops.
Sections 215 and 216 could be construed as a permanent pork-
barreling of state institutions to the benefit of those cities having
constitutional designations for the various institutional plums.
Article 50 earmarks a one mill statewide levy for maintenance
of the state medical center at Grand Forks thereby assuring mini-
mum support for that particular function.
To some, article 54 providing for the constitutionally independ-
ent board of higher education constitutes the protection of the special
interests of higher education. (Whether that is adverse to the in-
terests of the public at large is subject to debate.)
The exemption of "property used exclusively for schools, reli-
gious, cemetery, charitable or other public purposes" 41 from property
taxes is regarded by some local officials, concerned over the narrow-
ing tax base, as an unjustifiable tax shelter.
On the whole, the North Dakota Constitution is relatively inno-
cent of the common indictment of "special interest" protection.
9. Meaningless Verbiage
Poor draftsmanship, a changing federal jurisdiction and the
passage of time have all left state constitutions burdened with mean-
ingless phrases, sections and articles that do nothing but lumber up42
the state's fundamental law.
At least one-third of the present North Dakota Constitution could
be removed as superfluous without altering the effect or meaning of
a single provision.
A major category of "excessive verbiage" includes those sections
that make legislative action permissive. Since it is a principle of
state constitutional law that a state legislature has the power to en-
act all legislation not prohibited by the state constitution, all pro-
visions providing that the legislature may enact certain laws are ex-
traneous.
Most of the language in the article on Declaration of Rights could
be construed as superfluous in the light of United States Supreme
41. N.D. CONST. art XI, § 176.
42. A term used with abandon during the debates in the 1889 North Dakota Consti-
tutional Convention to identify meaningless language.
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Court decisions bringing almost all of the Bill of Rights to protect
citizens from their state governments as well as their national gov-
ernment. Such matters as excessive bail, cruel and unusual punish-
ment, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, peaceable assembly,
public trials, subpoena, double jeopardy, due process, unreasonable
search and seizure have all been dealt with in Supreme Court de-
cisions. Language going beyond the present guarantees offered by
present United States Supreme Court decisions would be appropriate,
however.
Another series of extraneous sections was necessary only for im-
plementation of changes and are no longer relevant. Section 92 im-
plemented the organization of the state supreme court in 1889; sec-
tion 104 implemented change in district courts; section 82 refers to
the 1940 electoral changes for the office of public service commis-
sioner; the 2,500 words making up most of article XVI provides de-
tails for division of responsibilities with South Dakota; section 214
prescribes the geography of the various legislative districts for the
first state assembly; the 26 sections making up the schedule and con-
sisting of 3,600 words can be deleted.
Another category of excess verbiage could be called unenforce-
able generalities. In this classification, we would have to place: 1)
Section 2 which states that people have a right to alter or reform
their government "whenever the public good may require; "4 2)
Section 3 which states: "the state of North Dakota is an inseparable
part of the American Union and the constitution of the United States
is the supreme law of the land."' 44 This section needlessly recog-
nizes the results of the Civil War; 3) Section 147 which states: "a
high degree of intelligence, patriotism, integrity and morality on the
part of every voter in a government by the people being necessary. '45
It then proceeds to establish a public school system; and 4) Section
149, widely quoted by students of state constitutions around the United
States, provides: "[I]n all schools instruction shall be given as far
as practicable in those branches of knowledge that tend to impress
upon the mind the vital importance of truthfulness, temperance,
purity, public spirit, and respect for honest labor of every kind."1
46
The final category of excess verbiage would include the ridicu-
lous miscellanea. Here would be included: 1) Section 50 which pro-
vides that all sessions of the legislature should be open "unless the
business is such as ought to be kept secret";4 7 2) Section 69 which
provides that the legislature may not pass special or local laws on
43. N.D. CoNsT. art. I, § 2.
44. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 3.
45. N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 147.
46. N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 149.
47. N.D. CONST. art. II, § 50.
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35 subjects; 3) Section 70 which states: "[I]n all other cases where
a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be en-
acted"; 4 and 4) Section 75, making the governor commander-in-
chief of the naval forces of the state. There are numerous others.
10. Retarding State Response
The sum result of a state constitution framed in distrust, heavily
infested with legislative detail, providing for a deranged power struc-
ture, requiring constant amendment, demanding unrealistic levels of
citizen interest, perpetuating archaic structures, violative of the su-
preme law of the land, protecting interest groups, and encumbered
with meaningless verbiage is a state government that is unable to
respond to the challenges of the twentieth century. The vacuums
created by inaction at the state level are inevitably and eventually
filled by a level of government free to respond. In most cases, this
has been the national government. As a consequence, a major shift-
ing of power from the state to the national government has been
occurring with relentless persistence during the recent decades.
In the assessment of Richard Leach, a student of federalism:
. . the single most inhibiting factor preventing the development
of the states as full partners in the federal system is the handicap
that state constitutions place upon them'." 49
Unless state constitutions can be sufficiently modernized and re-
organized to deal more deftly with the problems of today's society,
it is likely that the federal government will continue to grow in im-
portance in public problem-solving at the expense of the states.
While the North Dakota Constitution is better equipped to cope with
the problems of the 1970's than are some state constitutions, it still
requires extensive revision if it is going to provide for a truly re-
sponsive, democratic government.
48. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 70.
49. Leach, Preface to COMPACTS Or ANTIQUITY: STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1969), qujoted
In D. MORGAN & S. KIlKPATRICK, CONSTITUTIONAL PEVISION: CASES AND COMMENTARy 5
(1970).
